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本文来自织梦
本文来自织梦
1. 上帝保佑那些付钱的人？
——在加纳，正式保险与宗教捐献的关系 内容来自dedecms
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本文使用田野实验，对“保险是宗教捐献的动机之一”的假说进行了验证。本文作者与加纳的一个五旬节教会合作，随机为该教会的一部分教众注册了商业的丧葬保险，然后让该教会的所有教众完成了一系列报酬较大的独裁者游戏，在独裁者游戏中，参与人需要在自己和宗教用品之间分配不同数额的资金。研究发现，注册了商业保险的人选择捐赠给自己教会的资金数额明显低于那些没有注册保险，仅知道保险存在的教众。注册保险的人也显著降低了对其他宗教物品的资金分配。接着，本文作者建立了一个模型，探讨宗教的保险作用，该模型和田野实验的结果同时表明教众把教会看作是保险的来源之一，这种保险基于“上帝会干预尘世生活”的信仰。问卷调查的结果显示教会社区中的物质保险同样重要，本文认为物质保险和信仰保险两种渠道并存。 织梦内容管理系统
This article provides experimental support for the hypothesis that insurance can be a motive for religious donations. We randomize enrollment of members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana into a commercial funeral insurance policy. Then church members allocate money between themselves and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with significant stakes. Members enrolled in insurance give significantly less money to their own church compared with members who only receive information about the insurance. Enrollment also reduces giving toward other spiritual goods. We set up a model exploring different channels of religiously based insurance. The implications of the model and the results from the dictator games suggest that adherents perceive the church as a source of insurance and that this insurance is derived from beliefs in an interventionist God. Survey results suggest that material insurance from the church community is also important and we hypothesize that these two insurance channels exist in parallel.
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论文原文：Auriol, Emmanuelle, et al. "God insures those who pay? Formal insurance and religious offerings in Ghana." Quarterly Journal of Economics (2020).
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2. 税收参与红利：刚果公民在国家对他们征税时增加了政治活跃性
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本文发现在一个脆弱的国家政体中，当政府征税时，公民要求更多的发言权。本文作者使用田野实验的方法，对刚果某城市356个街区中地产税的征集进行了随机分配，大部分公民都是首次在政府注册或者被要求缴纳正式税款。在这次税收活动中，控制组中遵守地产税征集的人数为0.1%，而实验组中遵守的比例上升到了11.6%,实验组中公民的政治参与率高过控制组5%（31%的相对上升）：住在被征税街区的公民更愿意参与市政厅会议或者提交对政府表现的评估。参与这些政府活动的成本大致等于居民的日均家庭收入，相比控制组，实验组的公民在政府活动上的花费要高出43%。实验组的公民还更积极地了解省政府的工作、了解政府的收入状况、减少泄露问题，并且更负责任地提供公共物品。这些结果显示扩大税基具有“参与红利”。“参与红利”是现代欧洲初期兴起的包容性治理中的重要思想，也是当代捐助国支持弱国的税收计划的理论基础。
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This article provides evidence from a fragile state that citizens demand more of a voice in the government when it tries to tax them. I examine a field experiment randomizing property tax collection across 356 neighborhoods of a large Congolese city. The tax campaign was the first time most citizens had been registered by the state or asked to pay formal taxes. It raised property tax compliance from 0.1% in control to 11.6% in treatment. It also increased political participation by about 5 percentage points (31%): citizens in taxed neighborhoods were more likely to attend town hall meetings hosted by the government or submit evaluations of its performance. To participate in these ways, the average citizen incurred costs equal to their daily household income, and treated citizens spent 43% more than control. Treated citizens also positively updated about the provincial government, perceiving more revenue, less leakage, and a greater responsibility to provide public goods. The results suggest that broadening the tax base has a “participation dividend,” a key idea in historical accounts of the emergence of inclusive governance in early modern Europe and a common justification for donor support of tax programs in weak states.
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论文原文：Weigel, Jonathan L. "The participation dividend of taxation: How citizens in Congo engage more with the state when it tries to tax them." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 135.4 (2020): 1849-1903.
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3. 工资以及不就业的价值 织梦好，好织梦
在诸如讨价还价模型和工资发布等涉及工资制定的模型中，不就业通常被看作是劳动力的外部选择，因此不就业是决定工资的重要影响因素。本文研究在初始就业的劳动力中，不就业对他们工资变化的影响。奥地利经历了四次大型的失业保险福利改革，这四次改革对工人不就业的选择造成了不同的影响，本文作者利用这些“类实验”的变化，研究工人不就业的价值。研究发现当失业保险福利变化时，工资的变化并不敏感：点估计显示失业福利每增加一美元相对应的工资水平的上浮不超过一美分，且敏感度不大于3美分。这种不敏感性具有普适性，在低收入且预计有较长时间的失业的劳动力和频繁更换工作的的劳动力中普遍存在。工资对不就业价值的不敏感性与广泛使用的纳什讨价还价模型的预测相冲突，在纳什模型中，工资对不就业价值的敏感度应该在0.24-0.48美元之间。本文的证据意味着应该在工资设定模型中，剥离不就业对工资的影响。
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Nonemployment is often posited as a worker’s outside option in wage-setting models such as bargaining and wage posting. The value of nonemployment is therefore a key determinant of wages. We measure the wage effect of changes in the value of nonemployment among initially employed workers. Our quasi-experimental variation in the value of nonemployment arises from four large reforms of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit levels in Austria. We document that wages are insensitive to UI benefit changes: point estimates imply a wage response of less than $0.01 per $1.00 UI benefit increase, and we can reject sensitivities larger than $0.03. The insensitivity holds even among workers with low wages and high predicted unemployment duration, and among job switchers hired out of unemployment. The insensitivity of wages to the nonemployment value presents a puzzle to the widely used Nash bargaining model, which predicts a sensitivity of $0.24–$0.48. Our evidence supports wage-setting models that insulate wages from the value of nonemployment.
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论文原文：Jger, Simon, et al. "Wages and the Value of Nonemployment." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 135.4 (2020): 1905-1963. 本文来自织梦
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4. 收入周期、变化的工作技能以及STEM（科学、技术、工程和数学）相关的职业 copyright dedecms
本文研究了变化的工作技能对大学毕业生职业收入的动态影响。本文通过分析所有可得的发布在网上的职位描述，衡量2007年到2019年之间，不同职业需要的职业技能内容的变化。接着，本文作者建立了一个简单的理论模型，其中工作经验的回报是在职训练和技能淘汰之间的竞赛，技能淘汰会降低工作经验的回报率，在变化较快的职业中，弱化年龄与收入之间的相关性。本文发现，选择了诸如计算机科学、工程和商业等技术密集型专业的大学生的收入溢价下降迅速，而这些毕业生也会随着工作经验的积累，逐渐从变化较快的职业路径中转出。
This article studies the impact of changing job skills on career earnings dynamics for college graduates. We measure changes in the skill content of occupations between 2007 and 2019 using detailed job descriptions from a near universe of online job postings. We then develop a simple model where the returns to work experience are a race between on-the-job learning and skill obsolescence. Obsolescence lowers the return to experience, flattening the age-earnings profile in faster-changing careers. We show that the earnings premium for college graduates majoring in technology-intensive subjects such as computer science, engineering, and business declines rapidly, and that these graduates sort out of faster-changing occupations as they gain experience.
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论文原文：Deming, David J., and Kadeem Noray. "Earnings Dynamics, Changing Job Skills, and STEM Careers." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 135.4 (2020): 1965-2005.
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5. 投入品市场中的资源不合理分配：合同执行力在组织生产中的作用
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合同的执行力度往往决定企业如何获取投入品以及如何组织生产活动。本文使用印度制造工厂的微观数据，发现企业生产和进货的决策在合同执行力较弱的州存在系统性的扭曲。具体来说，本文发现如果一个行业的生产严重依赖通过特殊关系获取的中间产品，那么当它们的工厂建在法院较多的州的时候（即合同执行力更强），工厂会花费更多支出来购买这些中间产品，其生产的垂直跨度较大。本文作者通过建立模型的方式量化决策对总生产力的扭曲程度，在模型中，假设工厂的生产活动可以使用不同组合的投入品进行，较弱的合同执行力激化了客制化投入品的滞留问题，进而扭曲了投入品使用的集约边际和广延边际。生产者在考虑成本最小化问题时，会同时考虑生产的均衡状态和投入-产出品之间联系的网络结构。本文接着进一步估计了衡量不同州合同执行力区别的结构参数，这个参数主要通过生产者成本比例一阶距的跨州变化进行衡量。反事实分析发现微观层面合同执行力上的摩擦会显著降低总生产力，这种下降甚至在宏观层面都可以被观测到。 本文来自织梦
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The strength of contract enforcement determines how firms source inputs and organize production. Using microdata on Indian manufacturing plants, we show that production and sourcing decisions appear systematically distorted in states with weaker enforcement. Specifically, we document that in industries that tend to rely more heavily on relationship-specific intermediate inputs, plants in states with more-congested courts shift their expenditures away from intermediate inputs and have a greater vertical span of production. To quantify the effect of these distortions on aggregate productivity, we construct a model in which plants have several ways of producing, each with different bundles of inputs. Weak enforcement exacerbates a holdup problem that arises when using inputs that require customization, distorting both the intensive and extensive margins of input use. The equilibrium organization of production and the network structure of input-output linkages arise endogenously from the producers’ simultaneous cost-minimization decisions. We identify the structural parameters that govern enforcement frictions from cross-state variation in the first moments of producers’ cost shares. A set of counterfactuals show that enforcement frictions lower aggregate productivity to an extent that is relevant on the macro scale.
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