唧唧堂:RFS金融学研究评论2020年9月论文摘要12篇

移动版  2020-11-07 18:11  来 源:网络整理  字号:

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解析作者 | 唧唧堂经济金融学写作小组:REBECCA
审校| 唧唧堂经济金融学写作小组:绵绵
编辑 |悠悠

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1. 初始代币发行:通过加密货币代币销售为增长提供融资

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与首次公开募股,风险投资和预售众筹相似,首次代币发行(ICO)已经成为一种新的企业融资机制。本文通过1500个ICO总样本(总筹资129亿美元),研究了哪些发行人和ICO特征可以预测成功的实际结果(增加发行人的就业人数并避免企业失败)。结果表明,成功与公开、可信的项目承诺和质量信号有关。并通过工具变量分析发现,ICO代币交换上市会带来更高的未来就业机会,说明代币流动性的获取对企业具有重要的现实影响。

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Initial coin offerings (ICOs) have emerged as a new mechanism for entrepreneurial finance, with parallels to initial public offerings, venture capital, and presale crowdfunding. In a sample of more than 1,500 ICOs that collectively raise $12.9 billion, we examine which issuer and ICO characteristics predict successful real outcomes (increasing issuer employment and avoiding enterprise failure). Success is associated with disclosure, credible commitment to the project, and quality signals. An instrumental variables analysis finds that ICO token exchange listing causes higher future employment, indicating that access to token liquidity has important real consequences for the enterprise.

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参考文献:Sabrina T Howell, Marina Niessner, David Yermack, Initial Coin Offerings: Financing Growth with Cryptocurrency Token Sales, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 9, September 2020, Pages 3925–3974, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz131 copyright dedecms


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2. 证券众筹的融资效率

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本文分析了分散的、内源性消息灵通的投资者的早期风险融资。企业家选择收益最大化的产品,而投资者则通过出资或弃权来传达其信息。企业家利用筹资金额所传达的信息来决定是否进行风险投资,其“决定门槛”保护了投资者免受不良项目的影响,创造了一种“失败者的祝福”,鼓励投资者在没有信息的情况下做出贡献。对投资者的吸引力降低提供减轻了失败者的祝福但可以产生一个赢家的诅咒。这两种紧张关系都会降低融资效率。

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We analyze early-venture fundraising from dispersed, endogenously informed investors. An entrepreneur chooses a payoff-maximizing offering, and investors communicate their information by either contributing capital or abstaining. The entrepreneur uses the information conveyed by fundraising amounts to decide whether or not to undertake a risky venture. His decision threshold hedges investors against bad projects, creating a “loser’s blessing” that encourages contributing without information. Making the offering less attractive to investors mitigates the loser’s blessing but can give rise to a winner’s curse. Both tensions reduce financing efficiency.

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参考文献:David C Brown, Shaun William Davies, Financing Efficiency of Securities-Based Crowdfunding, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 9, September 2020, Pages 3975–4023, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa025

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3. 当投资者激励和消费者利益出现分歧时:高等教育领域的私募股权 copyright dedecms


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本文研究了私募股权收购如何在高等教育中创造价值,高等教育是一个产品质量不透明且政府补贴很高的行业。通过994所学校的88笔私募股权交易的新数据,作者研究发现,收购导致学费变高、学生债务增加。另外,利用提高贷款限额的方法,发现私立学校能更好地获得政府援助。在收购之后,教育投入、毕业率、贷款还款率和毕业生的收入均变低,学校选择和学生人数的变化都不能完全解释这个结果。以上结果显示,在受补贴的产业中,价值最大化可能不会改善消费者产出。 织梦内容管理系统


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We study how private equity buyouts create value in higher education, a sector with opaque product quality and intense government subsidy. With novel data on 88 private equity deals involving 994 schools, we show that buyouts lead to higher tuition and per-student debt. Exploiting loan limit increases, we find that private equity-owned schools better capture government aid. After buyouts, we observe lower education inputs, graduation rates, loan repayment rates, and earnings among graduates. Neither school selection nor student body changes fully explain the results. The results indicate that in a subsidized industry, maximizing value may not improve consumer outcomes. copyright dedecms


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参考文献:Charlie Eaton, Sabrina T Howell, Constantine Yannelis, When Investor Incentives and Consumer Interests Diverge: Private Equity in Higher Education, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 9, September 2020, Pages 4024–4060, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz129 织梦内容管理系统


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4. 工作中的破坏性创造:财务困境如何激发创业精神 dedecms.com


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利用美国人口普查公司员工数据,本文证明了公司的财务困境对员工离开公司创业有重要的经济影响。在高科技和服务行业中,雇员是关键资产,这种影响会被放大。在具有可强制执行的非竞争合同的州,这种影响会减轻。与典型的企业家相比,困境驱动型企业家是高薪员工,他们从工作、薪水和生存等方面衡量,,找到了更好的公司。在受约束的现有企业中,初创公司可以弥补33%的工作损失。总体而言,现有企业的财务能力不足以寻求生产机会,这增加了经济活动向新企业的重新分配。

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Using U.S. Census firm-worker data, I document that firms’ financial distress has an economically important effect on employee departures to entrepreneurship. The impact is amplified in the high-tech and service sectors, where employees are key assets. In states with enforceable noncompete contracts, the effect is mitigated. Compared to typical entrepreneurs, distress-driven entrepreneurs are high-wage workers who found better firms, as measured by jobs, pay, and survival. Startup jobs compensate for 33% of job losses at the constrained incumbents. Overall, the financial inability of incumbent firms to pursue productive opportunities increases the reallocation of economic activity into new firms.

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参考文献:Tania Babina, Destructive Creation at Work: How Financial Distress Spurs Entrepreneurship, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 9, September 2020, Pages 4061–4101, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz110 织梦内容管理系统


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5. 企业为什么要持有现金?人口需求转变的证据

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本文利用人口统计数据引起的需求变化来提供现金持有的预防性动机的因果证据。研究表明,企业为应对投资机会的外源性增长而大幅提高了现金水平。本文还提供了现金积累和动态使用的新证据:受财务约束的公司利用内部资源建立现金储备,此类公司更早开始存钱,并能长时间保持高现金水平;不受约束的公司依赖外部融资来投资和建立现金储备,这意味着此类公司需要节省资金,并降低持有成本。 内容来自dedecms


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We exploit variation in demand induced by demographics to provide causal evidence of the precautionary motive of cash holdings. We show that firms significantly increase their cash levels in response to exogenous increases in investment opportunities. We also provide novel evidence of the dynamics of accumulation and use of cash. Financially constrained firms build their cash reserves using internal sources. Consequently, they start saving earlier and keep high cash levels longer. Unconstrained firms rely on external financing to both invest and build cash reserves, requiring them to save less and allowing them to incur lower costs of carry.

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参考文献:Igor Cunha, Joshua Pollet, Why Do Firms Hold Cash? Evidence from Demographic Demand Shifts, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 9, September 2020, Pages 4102–4138, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz124 dedecms.com


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6. 股息支付和展期危机

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本文主要研究当银行面临以协调为基础的展期危机时的股利支付。作者在模型中假设银行可以利用红利来转移风险,也可以向短期放贷者发出可用流动性信号,从而影响放贷者的行为。在均衡状态下,以上渠道都会诱使银行支付比未发生展期危机时更高的股息。在模型中,银行通过放贷者的推理和行为对其他银行施加信息外部性,为了修正这种外部性并促进金融稳定,模型中设定最优股息监管,比如设定有约束的股息上限。最后,作者还讨论了该理论的可验证性。

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We study dividend payouts when banks face coordination-based rollover crises. Banks in the model can use dividends to both risk shift and signal their available liquidity to short-term lenders, thus, influencing the lenders’ actions. In the unique equilibrium both channels induce banks to pay higher dividends than in the absence of a rollover crisis. In our model banks exert an informational externality on other banks via the inferences and actions of lenders. Optimal dividend regulation that corrects this externality and promote financial stability includes a binding cap on dividends. We also discuss testable implications of our theory. 内容来自dedecms


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参考文献:Ragnar E Juelsrud, Plamen T Nenov, Dividend Payouts and Rollover Crises, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 33, Issue 9, September 2020, Pages 4139–4185, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz130 本文来自织梦


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7. 逆周期银行股票发行 本文来自织梦


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在1980年至2012年期间,美国大型商业银行在信贷扩张期间筹集和保留的股本较少,这放大了它们的杠杆率。相对于随后的银行亏损,股票发行的减少很大。作者考虑了银行为何拒绝增发股权的各种解释后,找到了与政府担保导致的债权人市场纪律减弱相一致的证据。作者通过对德国地方银行债权人取消政府担保的分析来检验这一解释,并发现债权人市场纪律和股权发行增加。这些发现有助于解释为什么银行拒绝筹集股本,从而更有可能陷入财务困境。 copyright dedecms


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Over the period 1980–2012, large U.S. commercial banks raise and retain less equity during credit expansions, which amplifies their leverage. The decrease in equity issuance is large relative to subsequent banking losses. I consider a variety of explanations for why banks resist raising equity and find evidence consistent with the diminishment of creditor market discipline due to government guarantees. I test this explanation by analyzing the removal of government guarantees to German Landesbank creditors and find that creditor market discipline and equity issuance increase. These findings help explain why banks resist raising equity, making financial distress more likely.

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